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A SIGHT OF RELIEF: INVALIDATING CADAVERIC
CORNEAL DONATION LAWS VIA THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE
Khalil JaafarKhalil*

INTRODUCTION
When a person dies, various rituals take place. Family members and
friends of the deceased perform religious and/or cultural acts that are
essential in the observance of death. Omissions or incorrectness of
such acts are grounds for inadequate or incorrect conclusion to the
deceased's life. Even more disturbing to burial rights is corpse
The
tampering allowed by government statutes and provisions.
potential conflicts of interest arise from society's need to harvest
organs from dead people and the deceased's perceived privacy,
possessory, and other rights. Society's needs are reinforced by organ
donation laws, which frequently presume consent of the deceased or the
next of kin, and allow specially sanctioned persons to harvest organs.
Organ donation laws include cadaveric corneal donation laws;
permitting removal of corneas to be used in people with ocular
disabilities. Like many other organ donation laws, some cadaveric
corneal donation laws incorporate the principle of presumed consent.
Cadaveric corneal donation laws have been challenged under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and have withstood
claims of unconstitutionality. It is the author's intention, through this
comment, to scrutinize presumed consent cadaveric corneal donation.
More specifically, this comment will discuss the extent of property
rights in a corpse under the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the
property interest discussion, the topic will shift to the First
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Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and its relation to property.
Finally, the author will meet at the property crossroads of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to propose that presumed consent cadaveric
corneal donation laws are invalid.
Religious Backdrop
Islam
Cadaveric corneal transplantation laws that presume consent may
conflict with at least some Muslims, Jews, various Christians, and other
religious groups' First Amendment right to practice religion freely.
First, the immense importance of burial rituals is evident in the religion
of Islam. This religion requires complete preservation of the body prior
to and through the burial process. Although Islam's Holy book, the
Qu'ran, is mute on the issue of funerals, the genre of scholarship
known as fiqh, or religious jurisprudence, offers guidelines for the
burial of the dead.1 While the exact details of funerals vary among
sects, general themes abound: upon death, the shahada (declaration that
there is no god except Allah, and Muhammad [P.B.U.H.] is the
messenger of Allah) is recited into the decedent's ear, his or her face is
turned towards the Kaaba (the holy shrine in Mecca), and ghusl, or
washing of the body, takes place. 2 Following ghusl, the body is
wrapped in shrouds made of white cloth, in preparation for an
expedited burial.3 A procession, sometimes through a mosque and then
to the cemetery, is conducted, supplications are made, and the body is
placed in a pre-dug hole facing Mecca. 4
"There is no coffin and the corpse must not be violated by
cremation, post-mortem examination or dissection." 5 Islamic doctrines
declare that the corpse must be respected, emphasized by the statement
of the Prophet Muhammad[S] that "the breaking of a bone of a dead

1 HANNA KASSIS, LIFE AFTER DEATH IN WORLD RELIGIONS 52 (Harold Coward, ed.,
Orbis books 1997).
2 Id. The mandatory addition of "P.B.U.H." after the holy prophet's name is the
abbreviation for the Arabic phrase "Peace be upon him and his holy household." It is a
requirement for Muslims to place this abbreviation after writing the name of Muhammad
[P.B.U.H.]. Id.
3 Id. at 53.

4Id. at 53-54.

5 CEDRIC MIMS, WHEN WE DIE: THE SCIENCE, CULTURE, AND RITUALS OF DEATH 135

(St. Martin's Press 1999).
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person is equal to sin to doing this while he is alive."6 Prior to a recent
ruling by the Muslim Religious Council, Muslims were barred from
receiving donated organs. However, the Council now holds that
transplantations may be allowed as long as donors provide consent in
advance.7
Judaism
Another monotheistic religion, Judaism, has detailed burial rights.
Jewish law, Halacha, describes cadaver transplants as presenting
several problems: nivul hamet (mutilation of the dead), issur hana 'ah
(the prohibition against deriving any benefit from a dead body) and
kevurat hamet (the requirement to bury a dead person and all his parts
in tact). 8 As to nivul hamet, the source for the prohibition against
mutilation or desecration of the dead is from Deuteronomy 21: 22,23,
which states, "And if a man has committed a capital crime and was
executed, you shall hang him upon a tree but do not allow his body to
remain on the tree all night." 9 The Talmud expands the definition of
this prohibition by stating that any act which can be construed as
desecration of the dead is included.' 0 As to issur hana 'ah, the Talmud,
Sanhedrin 47b, states that deriving any "benefit" from the dead is
prohibited."' Finally, in reference to kevurat hamet, Deuteronomy 21:23
states, "Thou shalt surely bury him," and the Talmud expands this by
against the omission of any limb or organ of the body to
commanding
2
be buried. '

Still, with regard to deceased donors, another principle which
13
becomes relevant is kavod ha-met (the honor of the dead person).
Although the body is dead, it continues to be God's creation, and thus
14
Jewish funeral rites ensure that it be handled and buried in dignity.
Id. at 266.

6

Donald H. J. Hermann, Religious Identity and the Health Care Market: Mergers And
Acquisitions Involving Religiously Affiliated Providers, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 927, 962
(2001).
8 Rabbi Reuven Fink, HalachicAspects Of Organ Transplantation,No. V J. HALACHA &
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 46 (1983).
7

9Id.
0
Id

" Id. at47.
12 Fink, supra note 8, at 48-49.
'"

Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff, Choosing Life: Aspects of Judaism Affecting Organ

Transplantation,in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS & REALITIES 170 (Stuart J. Younger

et al., eds., 1996).
14

rd.
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Even though a cadaveric donation inevitably involves mutilating the
body, pikkuah nefesh (saving a person's life) is so sacred in Judaism
that it is construed to be an honor to the deceased person (kavod hamet) to use his or her bodily parts in that way. 15 Moreover, most rabbis
would permit invading the deceased's body to save or improve
another's health as well as his or her life, as for instance, in a cornea
transplant to restore a person's vision.16
Nonetheless, there has been some debate among Jewish scholars
in regards to corneal transplants. 17 The debate concerning corneal
transplants is as to whether such transplants are deemed to contribute to
saving the life of the recipient. 18 Some rabbis believe that the three
requirements are waived in the scenario of cornea transplants because
the matter is of saving a life' 9, while other rabbis assert that it is
forbidden for a person to donate any of his organs, including corneas,
after death. 20 Regardless of the jurisprudential positions, it seems that
some rabbis, and hence interpretation of Judaic law, forbid corneal
harvesting or transplantation.
In traditional congregations, the Chevrah Kaddisha (burial
society) cares for the deceased by cleansing and dressing the body. 21
Traditional Jews are buried as soon after death as possible in simple
white shrouds to signify equality of mankind before God.22 In
traditional Judaism, the decedent's prayer shawl is placed over the
shroud, embalming is discouraged, and coffins are simple and made
from wood.23 Lastly, the casket is carried to the grave, with seven

15id.
1d. at 170-171.

17Fink, supra note 8, at 49.
'8 Interview with Rabbi Steven S. Resnicoff, Professor of law, DePaul University
College of Law in Chicago, I1. (Feb. 25, 2002).
'9 See Fink, supra note 8, at 49-55. Rabbi I.Y. Unterman holds that corneal transplants
should be permitted because it saves lives in that a blind person is constantly confronted by
life-threatening situations. Id. Rabbi Ezekiel Landau reasoned that by saving a life the autopsy
enhances the dignity of the deceased and is thus permissible. Id. Several other prominent
rabbis take varying positions, with arguments dealing with Jewish and gentile cadavers. Id.
20See id. Rabbi Shmuel Heubner concludes that under no circumstances are corneal
transplants permissible. Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg takes the position that it is forbidden for a
person to donate any of his organs after death for the purpose of transplantation.
21 Constance Jones, R.IP.: The Complete Book Of Death And Dying 15-16
(HarperCollins
1997).
22

1d. at 16.

23 Id.
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and the rabbi recites from Psalms while the people
stops by pallbearers,
24
recite the Kaddish.

Other Religions
The other monotheistic religion, Christianity, takes a different view on
organ donation and transplantation. Catholics, for instance, currently
view organ donation as an act of charity, self-sacrifice, and love for
others.25 Current Roman Catholic doctrine views organ donation as
"meritorious," and regards transplants as morally and ethically
acceptable. 26 Somewhat different than Catholics, members of the
Amish community will consent to organ donation if they know it is for
the welfare and health of the recipient, 27 and they are reluctant to
donate organs if the transplant is unlikely to succeed or if the organs
will be used for research. 28 As to the Protestant faith, it respects
individual choice and a person's right to make decisions regarding his
or her own body. Followers of Protestantism believe that Jesus Christ
came to give life abundantly, and the reasoning that follows is that
organ donations enable more abundant life, alleviate pain and suffering,
and express love in times of tragedy. 29 As such, most Protestant sects
encourage or endorse organ donation, so long as those procuring organ
donation give proper respect to the potential donor's conscience and
convictions. 30 Another group situated under the Christian umbrella are
the members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Commonly known as "Mormons," this group believes that the decision
to donate organs is a personal one, necessitating the individual to weigh
and choose the one
the advantages and disadvantages of transplantation
31
comfort.
and
peace
them
bring
will
that
The varying Christian views on organ donation are contrasted with
Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. Buddhists treat
24

id.

25 Jennifer

M. Krueger, Life Coming Bravely Out Of Death: Organ Donation Legislation

Across European Countries, 18 WIS. INT'L L. J. 321, 336 (2000) (citing William H. Gerson,
Refining The Law Of Organ Donation: Lessons From The French Law Of Presumed Consent,
19 INT'L L. & POL. 1013, 1032 (1987)).

26 Hermann, supra note
donation. See id.
27 Krueger, supra note 25,
28 Krueger, supra note 25,
29 Id. at 336-337.
30 Hermann, supra note 7,
31 Krueger, supra note 25,

7, at 961.

However, the Church formally opposes organ

at 336. See also, Herman, supra note 7, at 962.
at 336.
at 962.
at 336.
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organ donation as a matter of individual conscience, 32 and since organ
donation is a noble act, Buddhism honors those who donate their bodies
and organs to advance medical science and save lives. 33 Hinduism, like
34
Buddhism, does not prohibit its followers from donating their organs.
In contrast to most other religious groups, Jehovah's Witnesses do
not encourage organ donation, but believe it is an issue left to an
individual's conscience.35
However, Jehovah's Witnesses do not
strictly forbid organ donation so long as all organs
and tissue are
36
completely drained of blood before transplantation.
ORGAN DONATION LAWS AND PRESUMED CONSENT
History of Presumed Consent In Relation to Organ Donation
In general, many commentators agree that all presumed consent laws
are based on the unclaimed cadaver statutes of the 1700's in England,
which were used to provide medical schools with a sufficient supply of
cadavers. 7 These laws were later imitated in the United States.38
Although the presumed consent of organ donation has roots in these
unclaimed cadaver laws, the societal problems of organ shortages and
medicine's increasing ability to transplant organs successfully have
precipitated states to pass presumed consent laws. 39 In 1965, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began
to draft a uniform law dealing with organ transplantation in the United
States. 40 The resulting law was the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of
1968, which encouraged voluntary anatomical gifts and provided a
hierarchy under which other persons would be allowed to donate the
decedent's organs. 4' A closer look at the 1968 Act reveals that the idea
Hermann, supra note 7, at 962.
33 Krueger, supra note 25, at 336.
32

34 Id.

35 Hermann, supra note 7, at 962.
36 Id.

37 Alexander Powhida, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed Consent To Organ
Donation Laws Of The Various States And The United States Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 349, 354 (1999).
38 Id. at 355.

3 Id. at 352-353.

40 Thomas M. O'Carroll, Over My Dead Body. Recognizing
Property Rights In Corpses,
29 J. OF HEALTH& HOSP. L. 238 (1996).
41 Maryellen Liddy, The "New Body Snatchers": Analyzing The Effect Of Presumed
Consent Organ Donation Laws On Privacy, Autonomy, And Liberty, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.

815, 822 (2001).
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of encouraging voluntarism is curtailed by the medical examiner's
ability to release a decedent's organs when next of kin are not available
to object.42 This caveat creates a form of presumed consent (discussed
infra) that seemingly allows an examiner, who is a "person[s]
authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body," to assume and
act upon the decedent's unexpressed desire to donate organs. 43 This
residual component of the 1968 Act is currently the law in the majority
of states.44
As science and technology advanced organ transplantation and
compatibility, states began to modify their versions of the 1968 Act to
increase organ donation, albeit with modifications that led to increased
45
uncertainty which undermined one of the objectives of the 1968 Act.
Consequently, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws reconvened and passed a new version of the 1968 Act,
appropriately called the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987.46 The
1987 Act provided some differences from the original Act, most
notably a controversial method for harvesting additional organs by
coroners

-

- the residual category (organ donation by persons

authorized to dispose of the decedent's body) in the 1968 Act was
replaced with a section authorizing a coroner, medical examiner, or
other official to release and permit the removal of a part from a body,
within that official's custody, for transplantation. 47 However, the
official's authorization was predicated on three requirements:
(1) An organ procurement facility must request the body part from the
official, who then makes a reasonable effort to locate the decedent's
8A U.L.A. 109 (1993). Specifically, the Act
commanded that in descending order (spouse, adult son or daughter, either parent, adult brother
42 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §2(b)

or sister, guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death, and any other person
authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body) family members would have the
authority to give all or any part of the decedent's body, assuming the family members were

available. Id.
43 Liddy, supra note 41, at 822.
44 Liddy, supra note 41, at 823. Those states include Alabama (ALA. CODE 1975 § 22-1942 (2000)); Colorado (CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-34-103 (WEST 2000)); Kentucky (Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.175 (MICHIE 2000)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22, §2902 (WEST
1999)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 333.10102)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §

26:6-58 (WEST 2000)); New York (N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4301 (CONSOL. 2000)); and North
Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §130A-404 (2000)). Id.
45 Liddy, supra note 41, at 823.

46 See id. at 823-24.
4 Id. at 825.
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medical information and inform the individuals listed in the hierarchy
scheme;
(2) The official must not know of a decedent's refusal or contrary
indication or a family member's objection to organ donation
preceding the harvesting; and
(3) The official must make certain that organ harvesting does not
interfere with an autopsy, and the body's physical appearance must be
restored after the removal, if necessary.48
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1987) has been adopted in
many jurisdictions; a version of the coroner release statute has been
adopted in a significant number of states.4 9 The coroner release statute
is predicated on necessary immediate removal of organs (viability) and,
as such, the coroner may harvest organs, if the decedent's medical
records or next of kin cannot be located.5 ° In essence, the release
statute expressly allows a medical investigator or coroner to release
organs in the absence of contrary notice, thereby emulating presumed
51
consent in greater force than the 1968 Act.
In adopting either the 1968 Act or 1987 Act, states have modified
the provisions through legislative efforts. 52 Modifications include
safeguarding the religious beliefs of both the deceased and appropriate
kin. 53 For example, New York limits the coroner's ability to procure
organs from a decedent if the coroner has reason to believe that an
anatomical gift is contrary to the decedent's religious or moral beliefs.5 4
55
Similar statutes are evident in states such as Iowa and West Virginia.
Other modifications by state statutes involve coroner release
specification - - i.e., anatomical gift laws limiting the applicability of

Id. See also UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §4, 8A U.L.A. 47 (1993).
49 Liddy, supra note 41, at 826. Those states include including Arizona (ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-842 (WEST 2000)); California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5 (WEST
2000)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. AN-N. §327-4 (MICHIE 2000)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 39-3405
(MICHIE 2000)); Indiana (IND. CODE. ANN. § 29-2-16-4.5 (WEST 2001)); Minnesota (MINN.
48

§ 525.9213 (WEST 2000)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-17-215 (2000)); New
Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-4 (MICHIE 2000)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2318.6-4 (2000)); and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §26-28-5 (2000)). Id.
5OLiddy, supra note 41, at 826.
STAT. ANN.

51id.
52 Id. at

827.

" Id. at 828.
54 Liddy, supra note 41, at 828. See also, NY PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4301 (CONSOL 2001).
55 Liddy, supra note 41, at 828. See also, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6-58.1 (WEST 2000) and
IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 142C.4A (WEST 1999).
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coroner release to certain body parts or tissues. 56 Specifically, fifteen
states have statutes that allow coroners to remove corneas or eyes from
decedents based on presumed consent. 57 These states that have adopted
presumed consent laws, although limiting removal to corneas by
coroners, are most pertinent to our analysis. Before we begin our
analysis of litigation on organ donation laws, we must first regress and
describe the principle of presumed consent.
The Principle of Presumed Consent
The idea of presumed consent holds that, unless a person has rebutted
the presumption of consent affirmatively, society may claim the right to
harvest much needed organs. 58 State presumed consent statutes fall
into three distinct categories: organ conscription laws, routine request
laws, and shifting presumption laws. 5 9 The first type presumes the
consent of the deceased and the deceased's family is not informed or
consulted; the second type requires every citizen to elect whether to
donate or to withhold consent; the third type creates a presumption of
consent to organ donation, but can be curtailed before death by the
donor or after death by family members who must be informed of their
right to refuse consent. 60 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1987)
presumes that one has not consented to donating his/her organs unless
either an organ donation card has been produced or a family member
agrees to donation. However, the coroner release statute is of the
"presumption shift" version of presumed consent because it flips the
presumption of the law from one of presuming no consent to presuming
consent with several requirements (including request by a facility, no
contrary indication, and no interference with an autopsy).6 '

Liddy, supra note 41, at 829.
57 ld. Some states that allow coroners to remove only corneas or eyes include Delaware
(DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 29, §4712 (1999)); Florida (FLA. STAT. CH. 732.9185 (2000)); Georgia
(GA. CODE ANN. §31-23-6 (2000)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §311.187 (MIcHIE 2000));
Maryland (MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §4-509.1 (1999)); Massachusetts (MASS. ANN.
LAWS CH. 113, §14 (LAW. Co-op. 2000)); Ohio (Oiuo REV. CODE ANN. §2108.60 (ANDERSON
56

2000)); and Pennsylvania (20 PA. CONS. STAT. §8641 (2000)).
58 Liddy, supra note 41, at 819.
59 Powhida, supra note 37, at 358.
60

Id.

6

Id. at 359.
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Cases Attacking Organ Donation Laws and Cadaveric
Corneal Donation Under The Fourteenth Amendment
One of the earlier cases to address the effect of presumed consent laws
in relation to corneal harvesting is Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc., v.
Lavant, where the Georgia Supreme Court decided state-affiliated eye
bank officials acting under Georgia's coroner release statute, who
removed the corneal tissue of an infant during an autopsy without
parents' consent, did not violate any property interests of the parents.6 2
The court, however, did recognize a "quasi-property right" to protect
family members' interest in the corpse; in this situation, though, the
"quasi-property right" did not rise to the level of constitutional
protection.6 3
In Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, the father of a deceased minor
asserted that removal of his son's organs without his consent violated
his rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 64 Furthermore, this case addressed the
constitutionality of Missouri Revised Statute §194.220, which permits a
hospital to proceed with organ harvesting after gaining consent of only
one parent of a deceased minor so long as the hospital does not know
the minor's other parent objects to harvesting. 65 The District Court
stated the procedures that due process may require under any given set
of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature
of the government function involved, as well as of the private interest
that has been affected by governmental action. 6 6 Factors to be
considered in due process claims include: first, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and third, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
62 Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).

See also,

Thomas L. O'Corroll, Over My Dead Body: Recognizing Property Rights in Corpses, 29 J.
HEALTH& HOSP. L. 238 (1996).
6' Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985).
64 Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 97-0271-CV-W-6, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10307, at *1 (W.D.Mo., July 8, 1998).
65 1d. at *24.
66 id.
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substitute procedural requirement would entail. 67 The second factor
(risk of erroneous deprivation) is eclipsed by the third factor
(Government's interest) because of the exigencies presented in the
organ transplant context and, as such, the second factor is not to be
considered. 6 8 Applying these rules to the facts, the court concluded the
plaintiffs privacy interest was outweighed or was far less compelling
than the Government's interest in providing for and securing a future
for the living. 69 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the
interest of the plaintiff, an "extremely minimal property right," is a low
right on the constitutional totem pole, and is further minimized by the
interest shared equally with the minor's other parent. 70 Since the
statute provides that either parent may consent, "it essentially
establishes a rebuttable presumption that one parent's decision
expresses the wishes of both parents." 7 1 The exigency in organ
procurement validates Missouri's action to create a rebuttable
presumption as constitutional. 7 2 In upholding the constitutionality of
the statute, the court concluded "the only constitutionally protectible
[sic] interest that a person may have in a deceased relative's body
should be characterized as a property interest . . . [and] any other
constitutionally protectible [sic] liberty interest that a parent may have
in a minor child dies with the child., 73 Thus, it is evident that at
minimum, and similar to the Lavant court, the Missouri court did
recognize a property right in the decedent's body.
Similarly, in Brotherton v. Cleveland, the Sixth Circuit Court of
74
Appeals admitted to a limited property interest in a decedent.
Focusing on Ohio's coroner release statute (Ohio Revised Code Section
2108.60) which allowed a coroner to remove both corneas if an eye
bank official has requested and certified the use of the corneas, and the
coroner has no knowledge of an objection to the removal by someone
authorized to dispose of the body, the court addressed the
constitutionality of the presumed consent statute. 75 The wife of the
6

1Id. at *25, n.13.
1(.

68

69 Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 97-0271-CV-W-6, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10307, at *28 (W.D. Mo., July 8, 1998).
70 Id. at *28.
" Id. at *31.
72 Id. at *32.
13Id. at *29.
74 Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 478 (6th Cir. 1991).
" Id. at 478-79.
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decedent had refused to make an organ donation after her husband was
pronounced dead; yet the hospital never informed the coroner of her
status. 76 The coroner removed the corneas tinder the Ohio statute and,
following discovery, the wife brought suit alleging Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process violations. 77 The court decided that although
Ohio did not identify a "quasi-property right" in the decedent's body,
the court concluded that the family's rights rose to the level of a
legitimate claim of entitlement tinder federal law, and reversed the
lower court's dismissal of the case. 78 In successive court proceedings,
(which named the above decision Brotherton I), the same court
reemphasized that plaintiff had a property interest in her husband's
body, that Ohio "failed to provide necessary pre-deprivation
procedures," and that the policy and custom of the county coroner's
office was "an
established state procedure necessitating pre-deprivation
79
procedures.'

In a recent case dealing with family interests in a deceased person,

Crocker v. Pleasant80, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the

parents of a twenty three year old son who had died and been buried by
the city without parental notification had a legitimate claim of
entitlement to procedural due process in connection with the burial of
their son. 8 1 The state district court granted a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, partly basing its conclusion on another Florida Supreme
Court decision, State v. Powell, that upheld as constitutional a state
statute that authorized removal of corneal tissue from a corpse without
permission of relatives. 82 The appellate court affirmed; however, it
also certified a question to the Florida high court to determine whether
the Powell decision precludes all § 1983 claims grounded on
interference with an interest in a dead body. 83 The Florida Supreme
Court, in answering the question in the negative, stated that Powell did
not necessarily mean that the right to possess a loved one's remains for
the purposes of burial should never be given protected status under the

70 Id.

at 478.

77 Id. at 479.
71 Id. at 482.
7 Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 557 (6th Cir. 1999). This case is also known
as I3rotherton II.

so
"
12
S

Crocker, v. Pleasant, etc., et al., 778 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 988.
The court in Crocker was referring to Staie v Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).

Crocker, v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 982 (Fla. 2001).
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Fourteenth Amendment. 84 Furthermore, according to the court, in
Powell "we explained that Florida recognizes a limited right to
possession of the body for 'burial, sepulture or other lawful
disposition. ' ' 85
The Powell conclusion was consistent with the
approach of other courts finding that such a right constitutes a
legitimate claim of entitlement or a quasi-property right.8 6 In reaching
the conclusion that a "quasi-property right" existed in a deceased
person, the court systematically described federal appellate courts
which had recognized such a right 87 : Lawyer v. Kernodle88, Fuller v.
Marx", Arnaud v. Odom 9° , Brotherton v. Cleveland9 1 , and Whaley v.
County of Tuscola.92 However, in several of these cases, although
quasi-property rights existed, litigants did not suffer a constitutional
invasion of any property right under § 1983 because the state statutes
adequately provided due process of the law. 93 The Crocker court's
holding demonstrates Florida's willingness to accept the "quasiproperty" interest in a dead body, in opposition to its previous stance.
The above-mentioned cases have clearly demarcated a type
("quasi") of property right in deceased persons. Such courts have thus
become more merciful in allowing families to have legal interests in
dead family members' bodies, whereas such rights were previously not
recognized. However, in the context of corneal transplantation statutes,
these courts have been unwilling to invalidate them on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Using some of the principles from these cases
and infusing them into other avenues may be more promising.
Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment And Use Of Property
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which is made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that
"Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise of
84

/d. at 985.
85Id.
86 id.
87

See id. at 985-86.

88 721 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983).
89 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984).

90 870 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1989).
9' 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
92 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1995). The Crocker court also noted an Arkansas case, Teasley
v. Thompson, 165 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Ark. 1942). Crocker, supra note 80 at 986.
93 Crocker, v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 990 (Fla. 2001). Those cases include Arnaud,

870 F.2d at 308, and Fuller, 724 F.2d at 719. Id.
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religion." 94 The Free Exercise Clause removes from legislative power,
state and federal, "the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of
religion." 95 Its function is to "secure religious liberty in the individual"
by barring "any invasions thereof by civil authority.' 96 The free
exercise inquiry is whether the government has placed a substantial
if
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and 97
burden.
the
justifies
interest
governmental
compelling
a
so, whether
Although the Free Exercise Clause orders that the government may not
pass laws that stifle religious belief or practice, a law that is religionneutral and generally applicable does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause even if it incidentally impinges on religious practice.9 8 Thus,
where a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo
the most rigorous scrutiny - - it must be justified by a compelling
government interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest.99 Furthermore, in order to obtain strict scrutiny on neutral
regulations, one must show100that they impose a substantial burden on
his/her exercise of religion.
In Lemay v. Dubois, plaintiff-prisoner at Old Colony Correctional
Center, who practiced the religion of the Native Americans, claimed
that in barring him access to his spiritual paraphernalia (necklace and
medallion, deer tail hair tie, feathers, sage and cedar), the Corrections
Department violated, inter alia, his rights under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. 10 1 The court held that plaintiff had
demonstrated a likelihood of success in establishing that the prison
regulation, which allowed certain religious medals but precluded the
use of spiritual necklaces of prisoners who followed the Native
10 2
American religion, did not survive strict scrutiny analysis.
94 Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1995) citing U.S.

CONS;. amend. 1.
95Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 384 (1990),
quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963).
96Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal, 493 U.S. 378, 384 (1990).
97See id.at 384-385.
9'Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1995) citing Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2222 (1993) and
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
99 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32

(1993).
100 Lemay v. Dubois, No. 95-11912-PBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645 at *19-20
(D.Mass. July 29,1996).
101Lemay v. Dubois, No. 95-11912-PBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645 at *1 (D.Mass.
July 29,1996).
102Id.at *19.
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Consequently, the court partially granted plaintiffs application for a
preliminary injunction, ordering defendants [Commissioner of
Correction and Superintendent of Old Colony Correctional Center] to
provide LeMay his necklace and medallion and permit him to wear it in
the same manner that other inmates are permitted to wear religious
pendants. 10 3 In deciding the case, the court stated that the prison
regulation ° 4 was non-neutral in that it benefited those who wish to
wear medals for religious purposes over those who wish to wear medals
1 5
for non-religious purposes, and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. 0
As to the remaining items sought by plaintiff (deer tail hair tie, feathers,
cedar and sage), he demonstrated a likelihood of success on his claim
that the permanent confiscation of those items constituted a substantial
burden on religiously motivated conduct that had substantial religious
significance. 10 6 The court discussed the meaning of "substantial
burden" as outlined in various federal circuits: The Ninth Circuit has
followed the reasoning that a law substantially burdens a follower if it
prevents him/her from engaging in conduct or having a religious
experience which the religion commands, and the burden must be
substantial and an interference with a belief that is central to religious
doctrine10 7 ; the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits use broader tests
that include conduct that is religiously motivated, whether or not
expressly mandated by the religion, explaining that a substantial burden
must either:
(1) "significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that
manifests some central tenet of a [person's] individual
beliefs,"
(2) "meaningfully curtail ... a religious practice of more than
minimal significance in a way that is not merely incidental,"
'03Id. at *24.
104 Specifically, the court said that, "[T]he regulations permit only two types of
necklaces, both subject to certain size and other requirements. Prisoners are allowed to possess
one 'religious medal & chain' as follows: (c) Religious Medal & Chain - an inmate may
possess a maximum [of] one religious medal to be worn on a chain. The medal shall not
exceed a thickness of 1/8" and a diameter of 1 1A". The chain shall not be longer than 20" in
length and shall not exceed 1/8" in diameter. No hollow type, locket type, or gem stone medals
allowed. The religious medal and chain must be purchased as a set." Id. at *9.
105 Lemay v. Dubois, No. 95-11912-PBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645 at *10
(D.Mass.
July 29,1996).
106 Id. at *22-23.
107See, e.g., Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1997).
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(3) "force religious adherents to refrain from religiously
motivated conduct,"
(4) "meaningfully curtail a [person's] ability to express
adherence his or faith," or
(5) "deny a [person] reasonable opportunities to engage 1 in
those
8
activities that are fundamental to a [person's] religion." 0
In adopting the Eighth Circuit's definition of "substantial burden," the
court reasoned that the regulation was a substantial burden on
plaintiff's exercise of religion. 1 09
Another case upholding a religious practice with property is Black
Hawk v. Pennsylvania.110 Plaintiff Native American brought an action
claiming that defendants violated his right to free exercise of religion
by refusing to grant him an exception to a permit fee requirement for
I
the possession of his two bears, which were of religious significance. I
During the action, plaintiffs bears escaped and harmed two individuals
before being captured; thereafter, defendants sought to have one of the
animals destroyed." 2 Plaintiffs request for preliminary injunction in
precluding the destruction of the bear was granted since the plaintiff
showed a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits because
defendants did not establish that destruction was the least restrictive
alternative to advance their compelling interest in protecting public
safety."13 Although protection of public health is a compelling interest
and the destruction of the bear would advance that interest, plaintiff had
provided that the destruction is not narrowly tailored to advance the
government's interests. 14 The bear could have been quarantined as an
108 LeMay v. Dubois, No. 95-1 1912-PBS, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 11645 at *21 (D.Mass. July

29, 1996).
109Id. at *22.

But note, the Eighth Circuit's broader test of including religiously

motivated as well as religiously compelled conduct is consistent with the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1993 [RFRA], 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb. The RFRA was later held
unconstitutional insofar as it applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment by the U.S.
Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See U.S. v. Any And All
Radio Station Transmission, et al., No. 99-2260, 1999 LEXIS 13967 at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31,
1999). Since the LeMay case was decided on the basis of the Eighth Circuit (who in turn based
its test to be "consistent" with the RFRA) it may not be as forceful in our argument as
necessary. However, as noted by the LeMay court, "substantial burden" has several
definitions, which will be applied in our argument.
11oBlack Hawk v. Pennsylvania, 114 F.Supp. 2d 327 (M.D. Pa 2000).

.I.
Id. at 328.
112id.
13"

d. at 333.

114Black

Hawk v. Pennsylvania, 114 F. Supp. 2d 327, 333 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
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alternative to destruction and, as such, the public could be protected
while preserving the bear. 115 In its decision, the court followed the
"substantial burden" definition as suggested by the Supreme Court:
"substantial burden" should be restricted to government action that
forces individuals into violating their religious beliefs or penalizing
an equal share
religious activity by disallowing the affected individuals
1 16
of rights, benefits and privileges enjoyed by others.
MESHING OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
RELATION TO CADAVERIC CORNEAL DONATION LAWS
It is evident that courts have inched their way to recognizing a type of
interest in a deceased's body as evidenced in state courts, federal
district courts and appellate courts. 11 7 Whether labeled a "quasiproperty" right protected, right of possession, right of entitlement or
any other similar label, it is clear that courts have recognized limited
rights for decedents' families. 1 8 Furthermore, this minimum interest in
the dead body can be viewed as allowing a family to practice its
religious burial rights appropriately. If courts have been willing to
permit limited interests in corpses, and other courts have been willing
to uphold uses with religious property (See supra, the Free Exercise
cases), it may well be that the use of a "religious limited property" (the
deceased's body) is protected under the guise of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. Cadaveric corneal donation statutes,
to at least be attacked by strict scrutiny, must not be neutral nor have a
general application. At first glance, these statutes seem to be neutral in
that they do not specify any religions. However, since application of
the cadaveric corneal donation laws readily affects those religions that
forbid tampering with corpses and not religions that allow tampering,
corneal statutes are not neutral on their face. Thus, such statutes are not
religion-neutral and generally applicable, thereby necessitating strict
scrutiny analysis. In other words, the statutes must be justified by a
compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.
5
Id. at 333.
.16Id. at 331, n.9. The suggestion was offered in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery

'

Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988). See id.
117 See supra

11 Id.

notes 63-64; 74;80; 88-92.
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Even if the statutes are considered neutral, to achieve strict
scrutiny analysis, one must show that corneal donation statues invoke a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion. Applying the various
Circuit Court definitions of "substantial burden" on religious activity,
all definitions would require strict scrutiny application since cadaveric
corneal donation statutes impose a substantial burden. According to the
Ninth Circuit's narrow definition, a law substantially burdens a
follower if it prevents him/her from engaging in conduct or having a
religious experience which the religion commands, and the burden
must be substantial and an interference with a belief that is central to
religious doctrine.' 19 Although arguably central to religious doctrine (it
is central to burial rights), it is clearly a religious command by Islam,
and to a significant degree Judaism, that no one tampers with the
corpse. Furthermore, corneal harvesting under the presumed consent
laws would theoretically be at odds with the Mormons (personal
decision and weighing the advantages and disadvantages occurs while
the donor is alive), Jehovah's Witnesses (organs and tissue are rarely
ever drained completely of blood before transplantation), and
Protestants (person's right to make decisions regarding his or her own
body), thereby evincing a substantial burden under the Ninth Circuit's
definition. At a minimum then, the statutes obstruct Muslims (and to a
lesser degree Jews) from engaging in conduct which their respective
religions command, and frustrate organ donation principles among
Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Protestants. Hence, under the
Ninth Circuit's test of substantial burden, the statutes probably will
elicit strict scrutiny analysis.
Irrespective of the Ninth Circuit analysis, the Seventh, Eighth and
Tenth Circuit's broader definition of substantial burden will surely
meet the requirement of strict scrutiny. Several of the five factors are
fulfilled:
(1) corneal removal significantly inhibits conduct that
manifests some central tenet of Muslims or Jewish belief; (2) cadaveric
corneal donation laws (in a non-incidental way) meaningfully curtail a
Muslim and Jewish practice of burial; and (5) cadaveric corneal
donation laws deny a Muslim or Jew all opportunities to engage in
burial activities that are fundamental to their respective religions. As
these Circuits have discussed, strict scrutiny analysis is satisfied when
1 20
any of the five factors are met.
'

19
See supra note 107.
20See supra note 108.

CADA VERIC CORNEAL DONATION LAWS

2002]

Moreover, if the Supreme Court's definition of substantial burden
applied - which states that government action that forces individuals
into violating their religious beliefs or penalizing religious activity by
disallowing the affected individuals an equal share of rights, benefits
and privileges enjoyed by others - then strict scrutiny would also be
triggered.12 1 Cadaveric corneal donation laws force Muslims and Jews
into violating their religious beliefs by allowing coroners to tamper
with corpses. As noted earlier, such action is in direct opposition with
Jewish and Islamic beliefs. These laws also violate religious beliefs of
others: they force Mormons to give up their decision on whether or not
to donate organs, they preclude Jehovah's Witnesses from fulfilling
their requirement of blood drainage, and they eliminate the choice of
Protestants to choose a course of action regarding their bodies.
As to the non-neutral analysis of the statutes (or to the neutral
analysis of substantial burden which, as noted above, will trigger strict
scrutiny), it is obvious that curing blindness and other ocular conditions
are a compelling government interest. However, the second prong of
the strict scrutiny analysis is not met in relation to corneal donation
laws - - narrow tailoring to advance the government's interest. The
states that allow cadaveric corneal donation laws under presumed
consent could use other means in addressing the societal problems of
ocular conditions. Namely, such states could make laws that allow for
corneal removal only from religious groups that are not offended by
such action. For example, states could pass corneal laws that allow
removal with the caveat that Muslims and Jews and other groups are
exempt.
Alternatively, states could have "religiously sensitive"
coroners who are aware of the religious implications as to burial rights
among various religions.
Thus, under a strict scrutiny analysis by
either method (neutral or non-neutral regulation), cadaveric corneal
donation laws are unconstitutional for violating the Free Exercise
Clause.
CONCLUSION
From the stances on property interests of several courts, and the current
position of Free Exercise analysis, it is quite likely that presumed
consent cadaveric corneal donation laws are unconstitutional, as
substantially burdening certain religious groups in conducting their
121See

supra note 116.

178
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religious practices to their limited form of property: their loved one's
body.

